


# 통합 인증 시스템 설계 및 구현



연세대학교 전기·전자공학과  
정연식, 송홍엽






# Contents



- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Previous Works
- ▶ Design and Implementation of Public-Key Infrastructure
- ▶ Design and Implementation of Single Sign-On
- ▶ Conclusion





# Introduction



## ▶ Multi–Server Environment

- ▶ Problems of multiple passwords
- ▶ Problems of implementation of challenge–response protocol
- ▶ Single Sign–On

## ▶ Single Sign–On

- ▶ Integration of authentication schemes inside domain of service
- ▶ A user logs in once using a **single** password, and gets authenticated access to all servers in the Intranet
- ▶ Without sending any passwords over the network




# Previous Works: Kerberos



## ▶ Kerberos System

- ▶ Based on secret-key cryptosystem
- ▶ Based on Needham-Schroeder's third-party protocol




# Previous Works: Netscape's SSO



## ► Netscape's SuiteSpot Server

- ▶ Based on digital signature
- ▶ Based on Secure Socket Layer(SSL)


Step 1. User enters private-key password.



Step 3. Client sends the certificate and the digital signature over the SSL connection.

**Client**

Step 2. Client retrieves private-key and generates the digital signature.



**SuiteSpot Server**

Step 4. Server authenticates user's identity.

**Directory Server**



Step 5. Server checks whether certificate is in LDAP entry for user.

Step 6. Server authorizes access for user.





# The Proposed Single Sign-On



## ► The Proposed Single Sign-On

- ▶ Based on Public-Key Infrastructure
- ▶ Use of challenge-response protocol






# Contents




- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Previous Works
- ✓ Design and Implementation of Public-Key Infrastructure
- ▶ Design and Implementation of Single Sign-On
- ▶ Conclusion





# Public-Key Infrastructure



## ▶ Concept


- ▶ Enables the use of public-key encryption and digital signature in a consistent manner
- ▶ Certificate management infrastructure
  - ▶ Issues and provides access to public-key certificates
- ▶ Network of certificate authorities

## ▶ Components

- ▶ Certificate Authority(CA) server
- ▶ Directory server
- ▶ Client modules



# Generation of Certificate



## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Generates certificates
- ▶ Registers the certificates into the directory server
- ▶ Issues certificates
  - ▶ Using PIN
- ▶ Revokes certificates
  - ▶ Simply deletes a user entry and its attribute from the directory
  - ▶ Does not need the use of certificate revocation list(CRL)

## ▶ Implementation


- ▶ Apache web server
- ▶ CGI programming



# Certificate



- ▶ X.509 Certificate Format
  - ▶ Version
    - ▶ ver.1
  - ▶ Signature algorithm identifier
    - ▶ MD5 with RSA encryption
  - ▶ Issuer name
    - ▶ Root CA(Yonsei CA)
  - ▶ Period of validity: Not before
    - ▶ Present date
  - ▶ Period of validity: Not after
    - ▶ Present date + 1 year
  - ▶ Subject's public-key info
    - ▶ RSA algorithm



## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Stores the certificates and CRLs
- ▶ Makes all stored certificates available on request


## ▶ Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)

- ▶ Simplified DAP(X.500)
- ▶ Runs directly over TCP or other reliable transport layer

## ▶ Implementation

- ▶ OpenLDAP release distribution
  - ▶ Stand-alone LDAP daemon: SLAPD server
- ▶ Binary to ASCII conversion
  - ▶ Base-64 encoding/decoding algorithm





# Client Module



## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Generates public/private-key pairs
  - ▶ RSA key pair
  - ▶ Size of modulus: 1024bit
- ▶ Encrypts the private-key and saves into the local machine
  - ▶ Password-based encryption
- ▶ Generates certification requests
  - ▶ PKCS #10
- ▶ Communicates with the CA server to send certification request

## ▶ Implementation

- ▶ Visual Basic Script language
- ▶ Microsoft ActiveX control programming
- ▶ Socket programming





# CA Server

인증서 신청 - Microsoft Internet Explorer

파일(F) 편집(E) 보기(V) 즐겨찾기(A) 도구(I) 도움말(H)

뒤로 앞으로 종지 새창고침 홀더 검색 즐겨찾기 목록보기 메일 크기 인쇄 폰트 전화걸기 Real.com Messenger 미동 연결

주소(D) http://hyde.yonsei.ac.kr/ca/apply.html

## 인증서 신청

인증서 신청페이지입니다. 모든 정보는 영어로 입력하여 주시기 바랍니다.  
입력하신 내용(E-Mail 제외)은 네트워크상으로 전송되지 않습니다.

이름

국가

시,도

기관(회사)

전화번호

비밀번호는 개인키를 암호화하여 저장하기 위한 Pass-Phrase로 사용됩니다.(영문 20자, 한글 10자)

비밀번호

비밀번호 확인


인증서 발급 및 변경, 취소를 위한 PIN 번호를 받으시기 위해서는 E-Mail 주소를 정확히 기입하셔야 합니다.

E-Mail

인증서 신청이 처리 되는대로 E-Mail을 통해 PIN 번호를 보내드리겠습니다.  
[인증서 발급페이지](#)에서 PIN 번호를 이용하여 인증서를 발급받아 사용하실 수 있습니다.

인터넷





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


# The Proposed Single Sign-On



## Components

- ▶ Authentication server
- ▶ Application servers
- ▶ Client modules



# Requirements Capture




## Message Sequence Chart

- ▶ Guide for designing the system
- ▶ Visualization of the system runs

Messages	Subjects	Parameters
service_req	Client (User) ↔ Application Server	URI, userEmail
service_resp		flag
auth_req	Application Server ↔ Authentication Server	serverName, userEmail, randStr
auth_resp		userEmail, ticket
password_req	Authentication Server ↔ Client (User)	—
password_resp		flag
cert_req	Authentication Server ↔ LDAP Server	—
cert_resp		certificate
signature_req	Authentication Server ↔ Client (User)	randNum
signature_resp		signedData


# Scenario 1



First login:  
General case




# Scenario 2



In case a user enters invalid password


# Scenario 3



In case a user accesses the same application server  
from the same client within timer expiration




# Scenario 4



In case a user accesses another application server from  
the same client within timer expiration



# Scenario 5



In case an opponent accesses the application server  
from the another client within timer expiration




# Scenario 6



## randStr & ticket


- ▶ Application server can be accessed through two URLs
- ▶ To prevent an opponent from directly accessing an application server without authentication protocol
- ▶ Can prevent server-spoofing attack
- ▶ ticket: randStr encrypted by authentication server



In case an opponent directly accesses an application server without authentication process



# Scenario 7



In case a user  
sends multiple  
service\_req  
messages



# Authentication Server




## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Challenge-response protocol
- ▶ Generates the ticket
  - ▶ DES-CBC with all 0's IV
  - ▶ To transmit as CGI parameter
    - Base-64 encoding algorithm
    - Additional encoding: + → -, / → @, = → :
- ▶ Control of the timer( $T_{Auth}$ )
  - ▶ Implemented by checking the log-in time in the database
  - ▶ 1 hour

## ▶ Implementation

- ▶ Apache web server
- ▶ CGI programming
- ▶ Database management system
  - ▶ MySQL database





# Application Server




## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Verifies the ticket
  - ▶ DES-CBC with all 0's IV
  - ▶ Base-64 decoding algorithm
- ▶ Control of the timer( $T_{App}$ )
  - ▶ Maximum Segment Lifetime(MSL)
  - ▶ 30 seconds

## ▶ Implementation

- ▶ Apache web server
- ▶ CGI programming
- ▶ Redirection
  - ▶ Location header of HTTP





# Client Module



## ▶ Functions

- ▶ Decrypts the private-key
  - ▶ Password-based decryption
- ▶ Challenge-response protocol
  - ▶ RSA signature algorithm with MD5 hash function
  - ▶ Size of modulus: 1024bit

## ▶ Implementation

- ▶ Visual Basic Script language
- ▶ Microsoft ActiveX control programming
- ▶ Socket programming



# Conclusion



## ▶ Advantages

- ▶ Has the mechanism that a user directly connects the application server he wants to access
- ▶ Independent of lower layer protocol implementations
- ▶ Easy to implement and use in the Intranet

## ▶ Future Research

- ▶ Development of SSO for other application protocols
  - ▶ Current: HTTP
  - ▶ Future: Telnet, customized application protocols
- ▶ Extension to multiple-CA environment
- ▶ Use of smart card

